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[407] 
Remedial Clauses:  
The Overprivatization of Private Law 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin 
This Article considers the growing trend to enforce liquidated damages agreements or 
what I think are more felicitously called “remedial clauses.” I criticize this trend on the 
grounds that a permissive approach to enforcing remedial clauses contravenes important 
public values. Although many have claimed the traditional presumption against such 
clauses is mysterious or unsupported, I contend that the traditional presumption against 
such clauses enforces important values central to the rule of law, including that private 
parties should not decide their own cases and that the public has a special interest in 
deciding what remedies are appropriate for breaches of legal duty. In delineating the 
theoretical foundations for treating remedial clauses differently than performance terms, I 
offer a distinctive, liberal, and democratic perspective on contract and contractual breach 
that answers the common arguments offered by libertarians and law and economics 
scholars that freedom of contract requires the contrary. 
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Introduction 
Contract law is, perhaps, the quintessential example of private law, 
but even it can overprivatize. Recent interpretations of the Federal 
Arbitration Act have elevated concerns that enforceable mandatory 
arbitration clauses will multiply and, thereby, insulate many contractual 
relationships from appropriate public oversight.1 But, another disturbing 
legal trend in the United States has attracted little attention from those 
concerned about overprivatization—namely, the growing enforceability 
of what I call remedial clauses. 
Remedial clauses, commonly labeled “stipulated” or “liquidated” 
damages clauses, involve subsidiary private agreements within contracts 
about what remedies should be enforced when the primary contractual 
agreement is breached. For example, a remedial clause may stipulate, in 
advance, an overall compensatory figure for failure to render an agreed-
upon service, to provide goods by a specified date, or to respect a 
noncompete clause. Rather than having a court calibrate a remedy to 
reflect an impartial assessment of the actual damage occasioned by breach, 
the clause directs that payment of this stipulated amount should constitute 
the breaching party’s remedial behavior.2 These clauses substitute an 
 
 1. See infra text accompanying notes 92–98.  
 2. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating 
a remedial clause imposing a 120 multiplier on a licensing fee for breach of a contractual prohibition 
on replanting patented seeds); Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 330 F. Supp. 2d 383, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 
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agreement by private parties for what would standardly be a court’s 
judgment and, unsurprisingly, have traditionally faced barriers to 
enforcement. 
For example, in one recent case, a rental car company showed 
remarkable moxie by attempting to levy a $150 fee each time its GPS 
devices registered a driver exceeding a specified speed limit of seventy-
nine miles per hour for two minutes or longer.3 If the driver’s speed 
fluctuated, an additional $150 fee would be assessed each time the 
threshold was surpassed.4 The rental car company argued that the fee 
provision represented a valid “liquidated damages” clause for excessive 
wear and tear caused by speeding.5 This rather extreme clause posed an 
easy case for invalidation given the traditional common law approach in 
the United States that strongly presumes these clauses are unenforceable, 
except when actual damages would be difficult to calculate and when the 
stipulations represent reasonable and nonpunitive estimates of damages.6 
Consonant with a traditional approach, the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
scrutinized the provision and expert evidence closely. The court treated 
the questions of ease of damages calculation and reasonability of 
damages separately.7 Although the court agreed that the exact damage 
for wear and tear from speeding might be difficult to quantify with 
precision, it was not satisfied by the company’s argument that the parties 
voluntarily agreed to the arrangement and so the clause was valid given 
the difficulty of ascertaining precise damages.8 The court insisted on a 
close look at the evidence that purportedly supported the reasonableness 
of the fee. It found the rental car company’s remedial clause to be invalid 
given the unreasonable disparity between the $150 fee and the actual 
damages for two minutes of speeding, which were likely to range more in 
the vicinity of thirty-seven cents.9 The court also intimated that the two-
minute interval formula for calculating the stipulated damages was 
 
2004) (upholding a remedial clause requiring defendant to pay $10,000 for each month remaining on a 
breached accounts-receivable purchase agreement); H & G Ortho, Inc. v. Neodontics Int’l, Inc., 823 
N.E.2d 718, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a remedial clause allowing for either the sum of 100 
percent of the gross revenues that had been generated in violation of the covenant not to compete or a 
payment of $5000 for each incident of a violation of the covenant); Valentine’s, Inc. v. Ngo, 251 
S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding a remedial clause requiring landlord to pay tenant 
$100,000 if landlord violated the lease agreement’s noncompetition clause); Erie Ins. Co. v. Winter 
Constr. Co., 713 S.E.2d 318, 322–23 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding a remedial clause allowing 
promisee to charge all reasonable costs including attorneys’ fees incurred plus an administrative 
burden allowance of fifteen percent of remaining subcontract value if the subcontractor defaulted). 
 3. Am. Car Rental, Inc. v. Comm’r of Consumer Prot., 869 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Conn. 2005). 
 4. Id. at 1202. 
 5. Id. at 1201, 1204. 
 6. Id. at 1209–10. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1203, 1204 n.4, 1207. 
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unreasonable and irrational: a driver that sped continuously at eighty 
miles an hour for ten minutes would incur a single charge of $150, 
whereas a driver who, during the same interval, exceeded the limit for 
two minutes, dipped below seventy-nine for six minutes, and then sped 
again for another two minutes would incur two charges totaling $300, 
although she was speeding for less total time than the first driver.10 
As this case attests, the strictly applied traditional test is still in 
circulation. But, of late, in other cases, both courts and commentators are 
increasingly adopting a more permissive posture toward remedial clauses 
and signaling a greater willingness to enforce them. Judge Posner, for 
example, has complained that the common law rule presuming against 
such clauses represents “one of the abiding mysteries of the common 
law.”11 Judge Posner hypothesized that the rule is a mere historical 
artifact, reiterating Holmes’ protest that “it is revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV.”12 The prima facie resistance to enforcing these clauses has begun to 
relax in many jurisdictions where the rule has come to be understood 
merely as a rule against penalty clauses—those clauses that penalize 
breach as such and offer damages that evidently exceed the losses 
occasioned by the breach.13 Many commentators urge courts to go further 
and enforce even some penalty clauses.14 
 
 10. Id. at 1202. 
 11. See XCO Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Sci. Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 12. Id. at 1002 (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)) 
(complaining that “[t]he explanation for the rule against penalty clauses may be purely historical”). 
 13. E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 12.18, at 303–04 (3d ed. 2004) (“Today 
the trend favors freedom of contract through the enforcement of stipulated damage provisions as long 
as they do not clearly disregard the principle of compensation.”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 
1017–18, 1022 (1983) (discussing trend toward enforcing liquidated damages clauses between 
relational, business contractors); see also Walter Motor Truck Co. v. State, 292 N.W.2d 321, 323 (S.D. 
1980) (recognizing “the modern tendency not to look with disfavor upon liquidated damages 
provisions in contracts”). 
 14. See, e.g., XCO Int’l Inc., 369 F.3d at 1002 (“The rule against penalty clauses, though it lingers, 
has come to seem rather an anachronism, especially in cases in which commercial enterprises are on 
both sides of the contract.”); Avery W. Katz, Economic Foundations of Contract Law, in 
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 171, 185 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) (discussing 
“increasing trend in the law and economics literature . . . to encourag[e] greater use of and deference 
to liquidated damage clauses”); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 69 
(3d ed. 2003) (arguing liquidated damages clauses provide preferable remedial approaches in terms of 
risk allocation assuming transaction costs are low); Steven Walt, Penalty Clauses and Liquidated 
Damages, in Contract Law and Economics 178 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011) (documenting 
disparate criticisms of traditional bar); Larry A. DiMatteo, Penalties as Rational Response to 
Bargaining Irrationality, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 883 (arguing negotiated penalty clauses may be 
efficient); Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated 
Damages, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 633, 637 (2001) (arguing that “a law that holds all penalties as per se 
unenforceable is necessarily flawed”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, 
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977) (arguing remedial clauses may compensate for 
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This contemporary trend represents a significant change in attitude 
and practice. Traditionally, parties who agree ex ante to terms to resolve 
a conflict over the breach of a potential contractual duty enjoy little 
expectation that they will be able to enforce those terms should that 
contingency arise. Despite the parties’ agreement, such clauses are only 
enforceable under the traditional common law if epistemic difficulties 
(sometimes actual, sometimes anticipated) preclude damages from being 
ascertained with certainty.15 Even then, a resolution previously agreed to 
by the parties will only be enforceable if it represents a reasonable 
approximation of actual damages.16 Arbitrary damages, undercompensatory 
damages, and overcompensatory damages are thereby precluded. 
Doctrinally, this rule is intriguing both because it represents a substantial 
limitation on parties’ ability to craft legally enforceable agreements and 
because its substantive limits are stricter than the limits on the 
performance terms imposed by the unconscionability doctrine. 
This Article contends that the growing clamor to abandon this 
traditional rule is misguided. The burgeoning permissive stance toward 
remedial clauses fails adequately to appreciate the public’s interest in 
reserving remedial decisionmaking to impartial adjudicators who are 
positioned to tailor remedies with sensitivity to the details of the 
circumstances and significance of a breach. Whereas arbitration clauses 
permit a putatively impartial private party to substitute for a public 
official as the agent of legal adjudication and enforcement, remedial 
clauses replace quite partial forms of private judgment for the public’s 
judgment about the very content of the appropriate public reaction to a 
legal wrong. That is, remedial clauses displace the public’s role in 
determining the content of an important area of law and objectionably 
displace the judiciary’s role in providing fair and impartial judgments 
about the public significance of legal wrongs. The traditional presumption 
against enforcement of remedial clauses thus protects the public’s interest 
in upholding crucial values associated with the rule of law. By contrast, 
 
damages typically excluded from expectation damages); Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract 
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 616–17 (2003) (arguing parties may 
reasonably bargain for penalty clauses and court oversight has been flawed). But see Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1743, 1779–80 (2000) (arguing 
that cognitive limitations may preclude accurate assessment of the significance of breach). 
 15. Farnsworth, supra note 14, § 12.18, at 305 (identifying a condition under traditional common 
law for the enforcement of a remedial clause as “the damages to be anticipated . . . must be uncertain 
in amount or difficult to prove”); Arthur L. Corbin et al., 11 Corbin on Contracts § 58.1 (rev. ed. 
2013) (“In order to qualify as a liquidated damages clause . . . the injury caused by the breach must be 
uncertain or difficult to quantify . . . .”). 
 16. Corbin et al., supra note 15, § 58.6 (presenting the classical view that courts will only enforce 
liquidated damages provisions that reflect a genuine pre-estimate of the injury that will be caused by a 
future breach of the contract and that such pre-estimate must be reasonable). 
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the contemporary trend toward greater enforcement of remedial clauses 
represents a distinct form of the overprivatization of the law. 
The intellectual source of the move away from the traditional rule 
emanates mostly from a libertarian infused law and economics perspective, 
sounding mainly in two registers. First, the barrier to liquidated damages 
clauses restricts freedom of contract; the contracting parties are best 
positioned to decide how to negotiate and resolve breaches of the terms 
and should be free to do so.17 Second, because there is no principled 
difference between alternative performance clauses and liquidated 
damages clauses, there is no justification for subjecting the former to a 
rather permissive unconscionability standard but subjecting the latter to 
a higher standard.18 
As this Article will explore, these arguments for abandoning the 
strong presumption against these clauses ignore central values 
concerning the rule of law and the role of the judiciary (by which I mean 
to encompass the entire judicial branch, including both judges and juries) 
in administering remedies in a fair and measured way. These are clauses 
designed by private parties that purport to direct courts how to resolve a 
conflict and what remedies to administer in response to the breach of a 
legal duty. To rubber-stamp such clauses and afford them presumptive 
binding force would diminish a critical role of the judiciary and weaken a 
crucial component of the rule of law. Contrary to the complaints of Judge 
Posner and Justice Holmes, the common law resistance to what this 
Article relabels “remedial clauses” should not be viewed as an 
anomalous historical remnant. Rather, it represents the integration of an 
important component of due process into contract law. 
 
 17. See, e.g., XCO Int’l Inc., 369 F.3d at 1001; Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as 
Promise, in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 17, 27 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2012); 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 317 (1986); Charles Fried, 
Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 961, 969–70 (2012) [hereinafter Fried, 
Contract as Promise]. But see Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell 
L.Q. 495, 498, 500 (1962) (denying that restrictions on remedial clauses interfere with freedom of 
contract because freedom of contract just supposes an adequate remedy and not a chosen remedy). 
 18. For an example of such an argument, see Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and 
Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603 (2009). There, Kraus argues, based on a robust notion of individual 
autonomy, that “the promisor’s intent is the sole source of the content of the moral remedy for 
breaking a promise.” Id. at 1631. In the case of a single promise, the promisor is held morally 
accountable to perform that promise. Id. at 1637. However, in the case of alternative promises, the 
promisor may choose from one of many promised actions, each of which fulfills the promisor’s moral 
obligation. Id. In the context of agreed remedies, there is very little difference between liquidated 
damages and alternative promises and, as such, “courts must respect the right of the promisor to 
choose among the alternatives provided in his agreement.” Id. at 1643; see also Mindy Chen-Wishart, 
Controlling the Power to Agree Damages, in Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century 
271 (Peter Birks ed., 1996) (arguing that remedial clauses should be subjected to the same standard, 
namely unconscionability, as performance terms); Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 17, at 969–70; 
Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of 
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 383–84 (1990). 
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Part I describes the traditional common law’s doctrinal treatment of 
liquidated damages clauses as well as the somewhat more relaxed 
modern approach. It then proceeds to describe the contemporary 
critique of the limitations on enforcing remedial clauses, and, briefly, the 
direction of the steady doctrinal shift toward a more permissive stance 
regarding these clauses, particularly when they represent agreements 
between sophisticated, corporate actors.19 
Part II advances this Article’s central claim that remedial clauses 
should not be analyzed as though they were standard contractual terms, 
affecting only the parties. Rather, they are terms that suggest to a court 
what the remedies for breach should be and thereby implicate values 
other than economic efficiency and the parties’ autonomy. By 
considering remedial clauses only from the perspective of contractors, 
actual and prospective, the dominant law and economics analysis of these 
clauses has offered a lopsided intellectual treatment of the issues. 
Remedial clauses, affect not only contractors, but also tread upon the 
traditional domain of the judiciary and on significant values associated 
with the rule of law. These other considerations should supersede appeals 
to the efficiency of the contracting relation and the ex ante agreements of 
the parties. Thus, the enforceability of remedial clauses is justifiably 
limited and not merely when they impose penalties. I also aim to motivate 
and vindicate the other two traditional limits on enforceability, namely 
that the clauses only be enforced when reasonable and when damages would 
be uncertain. 
This argument requires addressing the challenges posed by 
settlement agreements and alternative performance clauses, which are 
close relatives, but not direct substitutes, to remedial clauses. Part III offers 
principled grounds to distinguish between remedial clauses and these 
distant cousins. 
I.  A Brief Summary of the Common Law Rule and Its Critique 
A. Doctrine 
A remedial clause, or what is usually termed a “stipulated damages” 
or “liquidated damages” clause, is a contractual term that specifies what 
duties, usually the payment of damages, will be owed by one contracting 
party to another should the former breach the performance terms of the 
contract. In essence, they are terms that prospectively specify particular 
remedies for the contingency that a legal duty is later abrogated. 
Because they are terms that purport to respond to the abrogation of 
a legal duty, I prefer the label “remedial clauses” to “liquidated damages” 
or “stipulated damages” clauses or agreements for two reasons. First, the 
 
 19. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 13, at 1017–18, 1022. 
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term “remedial clauses” clearly encompasses clauses that involve 
remedies other than monetary damages,20 including clauses that specify 
specific performance as the designated remedy for breach.21 Thus, the 
term is more accurate and transparent. Second, some courts and 
commentators reserve the use of the expression “liquidated damages 
clauses” to those clauses that stipulate damages short of penalties.22 They 
treat “penalty clauses” and “liquidated damages clauses” as mutually 
exclusive categories. Because it is often unclear or disputed which 
category a remedial clause falls into (impermissibly penal or not), one 
may be at a loss as to how to refer to the clause prior to the resolution of 
the issue. Thus, it is useful to have an umbrella term that encompasses 
clauses specifying nonmonetary damages and that encompasses those 
clauses that are either impermissible penalty clauses or non-penal 
liquidated damages clauses. 
In the United States, the traditional, strict common law treatment of 
these clauses has been to presume against their enforceability23 unless 
actual damages would be difficult to quantify with specificity at the time 
of contracting or at the time of breach.24 This limitation is often referred 
to as the “uncertainty requirement.”25 Even when actual damages would 
be difficult to calculate with specificity, the damages specified in the 
clause must also represent a reasonable approximation of damages and 
 
 20. One remedy specified in the contract at issue in XCO International Inc. was a royalty-free 
license to a patent. Id. at 1000; see also Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. v. Blair Rd. Assocs., L.P., 252 F. 
Supp. 2d 86, 94 (D.N.J. 2003) (upholding a liquidated damages provision that increased the interest 
rate on a loan in case of default); In re Stein & Day, Inc., 80 B.R. 297, 300 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(remedial clause directing a reversion of copyright interests upon breach); Osterhout v. Brandts, 220 P. 
171 (Kan. 1923) (enforcing a remedial clause requiring defendants to forfeit property upon breach); 
O’Donnell v. Lebb, 178 P. 212 (Or. 1919) (enforcing a remedial clause conveying a property deed in 
the event of a breach). 
 21. See, e.g., Reeder v. Carter, 740 S.E.2d 913, 919 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a specific 
performance clause in a marital separation agreement was not binding as such and does not negate the 
burden to prove equitable requirements for specific performance); Fazzio v. Mason, 249 P.3d 390, 397 
(Idaho 2011) (holding the court need not honor a specific performance clause as such, but that the 
clause is evidence that specific performance would be equitable). 
 22. See, e.g., Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Wis. 1983). 
 23. See Howard Johnson Int’l Inc. v. HBS Family, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 7687(SS), 1998 WL 411334, 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1998) (declaring that reasonable doubts should be resolved against 
enforceability); Thorne v. Lee Timber Prods., Inc., 279 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (declaring 
that doubts should be resolved against enforceability). What I am calling the traditional or strict 
common law approach is itself a marked change from the early British common law, which permitted 
the requirement of a bond, even of penalty proportions, and its forfeiture on nonperformance. See, 
e.g., John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 125 (5th ed. 2011); A.W.B. Simpson, A History of 
the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit 90–91 (1987). 
 24. See sources cited supra note 15. 
 25. Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. 
L. Rev. 351, 354 (1978); Goetz & Scott, supra note 14, at 559 n.22; Aristides N. Hatzis, Having the 
Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil Contract Law, 22 Int’l Rev. L. 
& Econ. 381, 386 n.20 (2003); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75, 79 
n.11 (1984). 
H - Shiffrin_12 (DUKANOVIC).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:40 PM 
February 2016]           REMEDIAL CLAUSES 415 
must not constitute a penalty.26 Thus, two elements must be met before 
the clauses are enforceable: first, actual damages must be “uncertain” or 
difficult to quantify;27 second, the specified remedy must be a reasonable 
approximation of the (uncertain) damages and, in particular, it must not 
be a penalty.28 Largely, other common law jurisdictions adhere to the 
same approach.29 
The legal treatment of these clauses in the United States is in flux. 
Some courts still take a restrained posture toward enforcement along the 
lines of what I am calling the “traditional common law rule.”30 But, many 
 
 26. One prominent departure from the traditional disfavor shown toward penalty clauses is 
contained in the statutory authorization of penalty clauses in credit card contracts for late payments 
and overcharges, clauses that tend not to distinguish the occasions of breach, nor their extent. Between 
1996 and 2010, a federal agency regulation permitted their imposition by nationally chartered and 
state chartered banks, preempted all state limits on their size or conditions of imposition, and imposed 
no limits on their size or circumstances of imposition. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act of 2009 imposed limitations on the size of the permitted penalties and expressed 
the principle that they should bear a relation to actual damages, but then created a safe harbor of $25 
that arguably ignores this principle. See 15 U.S.C. § 1665d(a) (2011); 12 C.F.R. § 226.52(b)(1)(i) 
(2011); 75 Fed. Reg. 124, 37542 (June 29, 2010). Other constitutional defects with the enforcement of 
excessive late fees and over-limit fees are discussed in Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Are Credit Card Late 
Fees Unconstitutional?, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 457, 457–500 (2006); see also In re Late Fee & 
Over-Limit Fee Litig., 741 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Piñon v. Bank of Am., NA, 
134 S. Ct. 2878 (2014). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 262 B.R. 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to 
enforce a remedial clause within a tax benefit transfer contract for airplanes between corporations 
because actual damages were calculable and did not bear a reasonable relationship to the designated 
damages amount); Hickox v. Bell, 552 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding a remedial clause 
unenforceable because actual damages for breach of a real estate contract were susceptible of 
calculation); Lee Timber Prods., 279 S.E.2d at 523 (citing ability to determine injury caused by breach 
as one reason not to enforce liquidated damages clause); Lee Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Kaiden, 363 A.2d 270 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (declining to enforce a liquidated damages clause directing retention of a 
$5000 deposit for cancelling a car purchase contract because the actual damages were capable of 
accurate estimation). 
 28. See, e.g., Howard Johnson Int’l Inc., 1998 WL 411334, at *7 (finding fixed sum due for 
cancellation of license agreement was unreasonable because it did not take into account the time 
remaining on the contract at the time of default). 
 29. See Saloua Hoeve-Ouchan & Giorgio De Rosa, Liquidated Damages and Penalty Clauses: A 
Common Law and Civil Law Perspective, Int’l L. Off. (July 22, 2013), http://www. 
internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=441bae62-38ab-4447-acc5-0edbae222998 (discussing 
Singapore’s rule following English approach); see also J. Frank McKenna, Liquidated Damages and 
Penalty Clauses: A Civil Law Versus Common Law Comparison, Critical Path, Spring 2008, at 3–6 
(discussing England, Australia, Ireland, and Canada but noting that by statute, India follows 
something more like the civil law approach). But see Prince Saprai, The Penalties Rule and the Promise 
Theory of Contract, 26 Can. J.L. & Juris. 443 (2013) (suggesting that the British approach only forbids 
penalty clauses but enforces other liquidated damages clauses). 
 30. See, e.g., Bral Corp. v. Johnstown Am. Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 599 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (upholding 
a liquidated damages agreement but stressing that damages were not calculable at time of contracting); 
Rogers v. Lockard, 767 N.E.2d 982, 990–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that ambiguous clauses 
should be construed as penalties and that one factor in invalidating a liquidated damages clause in 
breach of a real estate contract was that actual damages were easily determinable); Gen. Linen Servs., 
Inc. v. Franconia Inv. Assocs., 842 A.2d 105, 109 (N.H. 2004) (finding a liquidated damages provision 
would be unenforceable because damages associated with the loss of business are “not sufficiently 
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states follow “the modern trend,” and adopt a permissive posture toward 
enforcement, so long as the clauses are not intended, or do not in fact, 
impose a penalty for nonperformance.31 The states either explicitly 
ignore, or pay only lip service to, the “uncertainty” requirement, or they 
collapse the reasonability constraint into a mere inquiry as to whether 
the clause clearly operates as a penalty. 
The Restatement and the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) 
officially articulate a somewhat more positive approach to remedial 
clauses than the strict common law doctrine, but still place significant 
barriers on their enforceability that echo the traditional common law 
concerns. The Restatement specifies that, 
[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the 
anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of 
proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.32 
Although couched more permissively, by collapsing the separate 
elements into factors, the rule does not endorse reflexive enforcement of 
these clauses. Rather, it demands reasonability and intimates that the 
clauses are appropriate when and because epistemic barriers obstruct 
standard methods of anticipating or ascertaining damages at formation 
or at breach.33 
The UCC section, which appears in the Chapter devoted to 
remedies, roughly accords with the Restatement, directing that, 
[d]amages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the 
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in light of the 
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of 
 
difficult to prove” to support use of a liquidated damages clause); Tech. Aid Corp. v. Allen, 591 A.2d 
262, 274 (N.H. 1991) (holding actual damages associated with loss of a particular client’s business are 
not sufficiently difficult to validate use of liquidated damages clause). 
 31. See, e.g., Karimi v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, LLC, 952 N.E.2d 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); City of 
Davenport v. Shewry Corp., 674 N.W.2d 79 (Iowa 2004); Raisin Mem’l Tr. v. Casey, 945 A.2d 1211 
(Me. 2008). California has forged a unique path. By statute, it declares a presumption of enforceability 
of remedial clauses between commercial or corporate parties, unless the clause was unreasonable at 
the time of formation. A clause may be shown to be unreasonable if it is designed as a penalty or bears 
no relationship to a reasonable estimation of damages. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass’n, 
953 P.2d 484, 488 (Cal. 1998). But, California imposes the common law’s presumption of the invalidity 
of remedial clauses in roughly those cases where the parties include individual consumers, renters, or 
real property purchasers buying for noncommercial purposes. Cal. Civ. Code § 1671 (West 2015). 
 32. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 33. Many contemporary cases require the uncertainty to be present at formation (at least so long 
as there are some actual damages). But see, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (invalidating a remedial clause because actual damages were readily calculable at breach). 
The contemporary trend does not mesh well with the arguments I make below, but may well be 
dictated by the aim to maintain consistency with the Hadley rule requiring consequential damages be 
limited to those foreseeable at formation. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 
(1854). The Hadley rule might also be subject to criticism, as I argue in Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The 
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 724 (2007). 
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proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise 
obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large 
liquidated damages is void as a penalty.34 
The commentary for both the Restatement and the UCC emphasizes 
the doctrine’s aim as, largely, to distinguish penalty clauses from other 
liquidated damages clauses. On this reading, the former are invalidated 
as illicit efforts to circumvent the common law ban on punitive damages 
in contract, but all other remedial clauses are permissible. This gloss, 
however, is somewhat fast. It does not make sense of the doctrinal 
elements that stress the “difficulties of proof of loss,” nor does it capture 
the requirement of reasonable approximation and the bar on 
undercompensation. If the liquidated damages rules simply represented 
the ban on enforceable punitive damages, whether initiated by a judge or 
agreed to by the parties, then these other features would be anomalous. 
Indeed, the “mystery” of these factors runs as an undercurrent behind 
much of the criticism of the traditional and modern rules governing 
remedial clauses.35 
Notably, the civil law approach differs from the common law 
approach, both by showing no general reluctance to enforce remedial 
clauses and further, by recognizing enforceable penalty clauses so long as 
they are not excessive.36 This substantial difference places pressure to 
justify (or, in the alternative, modify) the Anglo-American approach, 
particularly in light of the wrinkles the variation introduces into 
international contracting.37 
B. Critiques 
The American scholarly treatment of these clauses in recent years 
has been mostly critical and predominantly conducted along libertarian 
and law and economics lines, mainly limited to a debate about the 
efficiency of enforcing these clauses—with a particular focus on penalty 
clauses. Although some law and economics scholars defend versions of 
 
 34. U.C.C. § 2-718 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2002). 
 35. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 23, § 125, (acknowledging that the uncertainty of damages is an 
independent, articulated factor in assessing enforceability, but also stressing many years of doubt 
concerning this “requirement”); see also Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 12.18. 
 36. See Hatzis, supra note 25, at 400–01. Civil law countries vary. Some enforce penalties without 
an excessiveness ceiling (for example, Spain), some enforce unless there is “manifest excessiveness” 
(for example, France and Netherlands), and some require proportionality (for example, Germany and 
Russia). The civil law approach may have moved slightly toward the common law approach in the last 
forty years, introducing the excessiveness limitation on penalty clauses and limiting what penalties are 
available where “part of the main contractual obligation . . . has been performed.” McKenna, supra 
note 29, at 4 n.8. 
 37. See Jonathan S. Solórzano, An Uncertain Penalty: A Look at the International Community’s 
Inability to Harmonize the Law of Liquidated Damage and Penalty Clauses, 15 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 
779 (2009) (noting the variation either renders the enforceability of remedial clauses uncertain or 
requires further negotiation and agreement about a choice of law clause). 
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the common law rule,38 the majority position favors abandoning the 
common law view and either endorsing a presumption of enforceability 
except where the clause is clearly a penalty clause, or enforcing all 
remedial clauses, including penalty clauses (perhaps with some limit on 
excessiveness).39 
The main lines of argument for this reform are: First, these are 
agreements between the parties, just like any other agreement. If we 
respect the parties’ decisions in other situations, including settlement 
agreements, without subjecting their agreements to special scrutiny, we 
should treat remedial clauses on a par.40 After all, the parties themselves 
are the best situated agents to assess losses and their significance. 
Second, enforceable remedial clauses may help parties avoid later 
negotiation and litigation costs.41 Third, although penalty clauses may 
deter efficient breach, the willingness to sign them allows contractors to 
convey their seriousness, competence, and trustworthiness. These signals 
of sincerity and preparedness may facilitate the formation of contractual 
relationships and contribute to their smooth functioning.42 Finally, 
enforceable remedial clauses may allow parties to make up for the 
deficiencies of standard contractual remedies by offering an opportunity 
to acknowledge and compensate for some nonmonetary harms of 
 
 38. See Clarkson et al., supra note 25, at 368–70 (contending that overcompensatory stipulated 
damage provisions may encourage uncooperative behavior by promisees in an attempt to induce 
breach); Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance, 
10 J. Legal Stud. 237, 243–44 (1981) (arguing that enforcing penalty clauses incentivizes parties to 
claim that the other party breached the contract, “[e]ven if both parties fulfill[ed] their contractual 
obligations”); Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual 
Environments with Private Information, 8 J.L., Econ. & Org. 582, 583 (1992) (stating that many 
scholars argue “excessive liquidated damages are presumptive evidence of a contractual failure such as 
fraud or mutual mistake”); Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the 
Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1195, 1198 (1994) (defending the common law rule 
because it reduces the incentives and abilities of parties “to engage in deceptive behavior during 
renegotiation”); see also Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and The Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629 (1988) (observing both that overcompensatory and 
undercompensatory damages, including over and undercompensatory liquidated damages clauses, may 
have untoward price effects but also that uncertainty about damage awards may also have substantial 
price effects). 
 39. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 40. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 41. See, e.g., Corbin et al., supra note 15, § 58.1 (noting that “[d]etermining the amount of 
damages that are recoverable for a breach of contract is nearly always a difficult and expensive 
proceeding” and, as a result, “contracting parties have from time immemorial attempted to determine 
in advance the character of the judicial remedy in advance”). But see Talley, supra note 38 (arguing 
remedial clauses may encourage deceptive renegotiation). 
 42. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985); XCO 
Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Sci. Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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breach43 or other harms of breach that are not legally compensable in 
contract, such as loss of reputation or emotional stress.44 
II.  A Defense of the Traditional Common Law Rule 
A. Remedial Clauses and the Judicial Role 
What follows is an effort to justify the traditional common law rule 
and its separate elements, an account that may offer some answer to 
these foregoing criticisms. The prominent criticisms of the presumption 
against remedial clauses overlook the special reasons that courts and 
judges may wish to exercise special control over remedial actions. Although 
the penalty clause is an especially clear example, it is not the only, or even 
the prototypical example of an objectionable remedial clause.45 Most 
remedial clauses, whether penal or not, objectionably displace the role of 
the judiciary in adjudicating conflict and ascertaining remedies.46 
Broadly speaking, what seems missing from these critiques is any 
sustained effort to gauge the significance of the fact that these are 
remedial clauses, rather than standard performance terms that embody 
the primary motivation behind, and the substance of, the contractual 
relationship. The fact that these clauses identify remedies does substantial 
work to justify something like the traditional common law approach and 
implicates the interests of other parties not considered by the dominant 
critical framework. 
Because these clauses purport to establish the proper resolution of a 
breach of a legal duty, they differ significantly in form from performance 
terms. This Article later addresses in Subpart III.C how remedial clauses 
may be distinguished from alternative performance terms; but for the 
moment, assume that a distinction may be drawn. This Article first argues 
what the significance of the distinction would be, assuming it may be 
made. 
 
 43. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Taking Outcomes Seriously, 2012 Utah L. Rev. 861. 
 44. See, e.g., Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357, 365 (Wis. 1983); see also Goetz & Scott, supra 
note 14, at 583; Richard Manly, The Benefits of Clauses That Liquidate, Stipulate, Pre-Estimate or 
Agree Damages, 28 Building & Construction L.J. 246, 255 (2012) (discussing ability of remedial 
clauses to compensate for idiosyncratic losses). 
 45. See William Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures: Before Peacy v. The Duke of Somerset, 29 Harv. 
L. Rev. 117, 129 (1915) (“[T]o carry the principle [of relief against penalties] to its logical conclusion 
would prevent the parties to a contract from defining in advance the extent of their rights and 
liabilities, in case of breach.”); H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp., [1976] 54 D.L.R. 3d 385, 392 
(S.C.R.) (“[J]udicial interference with the enforcement of what the courts regard as penalty clauses is 
simply a manifestation of a concern for fairness and reasonableness, rising above contractual 
stipulation, whenever the parties seek to remove from the courts their ordinary authority to determine 
not only whether there has been a breach but what damages may be recovered as a result thereof.”). 
 46. My argument thus resembles but goes beyond Yorio’s argument about specific performance 
clauses, which emphasizes the nondelegability of equitable powers. Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, 
Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions §§ 19.1, 19.2.3, 20.1–3 (2d ed. 2011). 
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This difference in form between performance terms and remedial 
clauses justifies the substantial difference in treatment along the 
following lines. Parties may, within broad limits, determine their mutual 
commitments and the compensation they will accept for performance. 
They have substantial latitude in creating a wide range of moral duties 
through promissory behavior. To the extent they contract, they generate 
legal duties that, consequently, have public significance and that render 
them susceptible to the independent oversight and judgment of the 
community. When they do not comply with these agreements voluntarily 
and cannot resolve any subsequent disputes amongst themselves, and 
one or both parties seek a remedy from a court, then they invoke the 
independent judgment of the judiciary. One of the essential roles of the 
judiciary is to assess the significance of the abrogation of legal duties and 
to apply independent judgment to craft a fair response to that 
abrogation. Sometimes in the guise of a judge and sometimes in the guise 
of a judge and jury, the judiciary serves as the community’s voice, levying 
its response to an abrogation of a publicly recognized responsibility.47 Its 
judgment that a remedial clause is unreasonable need not, therefore, 
focus merely on whether any specified damages are inappropriate in size. 
A court may also attend to whether monetary damages are appropriate 
at all for the relevant breach,48 or whether they are inconsistent with 
public policy. Where a nonmonetary remedy is specified, such as specific 
performance, enforcing the transfer of a copyright, or granting a royalty-
free license,49 the judiciary may not only ask whether the remedy is 
proportionate and appropriate for the breach and sufficiently responsive 
to the complaint of the plaintiff, but also whether there is an available, 
fair remedy that is less burdensome on the defendant or on the judiciary 
to monitor. 
Given this understanding of the judiciary’s role in reviewing 
contract actions and meting out remedies, privately forged remedial 
clauses should, at best, serve as a suggestion to the judiciary about what a 
fair remedy would be. They should not presumptively bind because such 
a presumption would eviscerate the independent role the judiciary is 
meant to play in the crafting of remedies.50 Complete judicial deference 
 
 47. See also Stephen A. Smith, Remedies for Breach of Contract: One Principle or Two?, in 
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 341 (2015) (offering an extensive defense of the view 
that breach is a wrong to which damages orders are a public response, importantly delivered by the 
judiciary). 
 48. See, e.g., Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to enforce a 
remedial clause specifying a $50,000 damage payment for marital infidelity on the grounds that 
enforcing damages for infidelity conflicted with California’s no-fault divorce system). 
 49. See XCO Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Sci. Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 50. See Macneil, supra note 17, at 502–03 (“[T]he parties are not free to make more strict the 
legal instrument provided by society. They are not free to change the nature of contract.”). Cf. Joseph 
H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 260–61 (1910) (making 
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to remedial clauses would render the judiciary merely the servant of 
private parties and would undermine its role as a party that deploys 
independent, impartial judgment to resolve legal disputes.51 As a further 
consequence, were remedial clauses to become more common, the 
judiciary’s reasoned contributions to the evolution of our public 
understanding of the proper resolution and remediation of these legal 
disputes would be substantially diminished.52 
For these reasons, the issue is not simply one about the sophistication 
or bargaining power of the parties. A rule like California’s53 that is more 
permissive with respect to remedial clauses crafted between corporate 
actors than with respect to those deployed against consumers might be 
responsive to concerns about the potentially compromised consent of 
unsophisticated parties or those in weak bargaining positions.54 Such a 
rule would still run roughshod over the values served by having the 
judiciary independently assess and mete out remedies. Indeed, those 
values may be heightened in the case of corporate agreements. Society 
arguably has a heightened interest in exercising oversight over the 
resolution of legal disputes of powerful actors who control important 
social resources and ensuring that public resources are only employed to 
enforce fair resolutions to such disputes. Further, to protect the 
reputation and the integrity of the judiciary as an impartial institution, 
 
the parallel point that enforcing choice of law clauses and the parties’ intent would substitute private 
parties’ judgment for the legislature’s and subvert legislative sovereignty). 
 51. Cf. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1994) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 
(1993) (“Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a 
whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes 
that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.”). 
 52. Similar dangers attend efforts by large companies to shunt disputes into arbitration and away 
from judicial resolution. Apart from the defects of the arbitration process, another loss occasioned by 
the (involuntary) shift to arbitration is the diminution of the judicial development of the articulation of 
the law in heavily arbitrated areas as well as the public awareness of the sites of dispute. See, e.g., 
Richard M. Alderman, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1 J. 
Consumer & Com. L. 85 (2008); Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the 
Common Law, 2 J. Am. Arb. 1 (2003); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet 
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 785 (2002); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: 
A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 
78, 169 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers]; see also Judith Resnik, Due Process: A 
Public Dimension, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 405, 417 (1987). Cf. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 
1073, 1085 (1984) (“Adjudication uses public resources, and employs . . . public officials . . . [whose] 
job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and 
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to 
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them.”). 
 53. See sources cited supra note 31. 
 54. See also Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 17, at 969; Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum 
Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1288–89 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Deep as the hostility to penalty clauses runs in the 
common law . . . we still might be inclined to question, if we thought ourselves free to do so, whether a 
modern court should refuse to enforce a penalty clause where the signator is a substantial corporation, 
well able to avoid improvident commitments.”). 
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the public has a special interest in ensuring that the judiciary uses its 
independent judgment when administering remedies on behalf of and 
against the socially powerful. 
This consideration about reserving the judiciary’s remedial power to 
efforts guided by its own independent and impartial judgments connects 
to another set of concerns. The posture of presumptive enforceability 
introduces the difficulty that, in principle, the abrogation of the exact 
same legal duty, for performance of the exact same activity, at the exact 
same price, by identically situated parties, in the exact same legal 
jurisdiction could nonetheless be subject to wildly different remedial 
orders.55 Although there may be sound reasons to allow room for some 
remedial variance between jurisdictions or to allow for the exploration of 
jurisprudential disputes, any variance arising from different remedial 
clauses that specified different remedies for the same sort of breach 
would not engage with those reasons. It seems in tension with the rule of 
law’s commitment that like cases should be treated alike by adjudicators. 
Thus, one way to understand the common law rule is that it represents 
the incorporation of some principles of due process into the body of the 
contract law. 
B. The Continuity Between Penalty Clauses and Other Remedial 
Clauses 
On the understanding that this Article urges, the prohibition on penalty 
clauses is not the central element of the common law approach to remedial 
clauses, but is simply the most concentrated instance of its fundamental 
concern. The basic problem with enforceable remedial clauses is that they 
substitute the judgment of private parties for the judgment of a public 
official when the decision to be made is an importantly public one. That 
problem is not confined to the case of penalty clauses, but would also 
attach to subcompensatory clauses as well as to remedial clauses that 
dictate the form of the remedy, for instance, specific performance clauses. 
To be sure, the problem of displacing the judiciary takes a more 
pronounced form when punishments are meted out. Legally administered 
punishments importantly express the position of the state—that is, of the 
community—that a particular behavior requires a special remedy: a 
rebuke and redress that goes beyond the compensatory and registers the 
community’s special disapprobation. For a court’s independent judgment 
 
 55. Of course, it is possible that, over time, competition might arise with respect to the content of 
the terms and that competition may introduce greater uniformity. Cf. Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1235 (2003). But 
see Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. 
Rev. 545, 565–66, 606 (2014) (arguing that inefficiencies may persist and may be exacerbated by 
consumer misunderstandings). Even were such competition to transpire and be effective, any 
emergent horizontal equality would be accidental and not the product of a commitment. 
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to be bypassed and for the court instead to serve as the mere 
administrator of a private party’s directive to punish is inconsistent with 
the public expressive purposes of punishment. Those purposes include an 
interest in replacing vengeance and private retaliation with deliberative 
and impartial remediation, and an interest in ensuring that punishments 
are fair, proportionate, and administered with some attention to horizontal 
equity. 
One might object that penalty clauses are not punishments in any 
standard sense and are not meant to express social disapprobation or 
disapproval, so the foregoing line of argument is inapt. Penalty clauses 
may instead serve a number of ex ante communicative purposes, such as 
conveying the special importance to one party of performance or timely 
performance, on the one hand, and signaling the other party’s strong 
confidence that she will perform and her strong commitment to doing so, 
on the other hand.56 The meaning of a penalty clause might lie more in 
the initial request for a penalty for failure and the willingness to be 
vulnerable to one, than in the significance of its later imposition. The 
later imposition of the penalty might not reflect any judgment about the 
breaching behavior but might merely be necessary to render credible 
future uses of this ex ante communicative device.57 
Despite the accuracy of the description of the motives of many 
contractors in seeking or agreeing to penalty clauses, I am unpersuaded 
that these facts create a gulf between penalty clauses and the appropriate 
legal and judicial norms governing the imposition of punishment. 
Doctrinally, the objection is hard to square with the commonly cited 
justification for the bar on enforceable penalty clauses, namely that they 
would allow parties to circumvent the bar on punitive damages in 
contract by will.58 Of course it is true that penalty clauses may be 
 
 56. See, e.g., Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 17, at 970 (observing that penalty clauses may 
render the promise and the promisor credible and thereby facilitate formation); Lake River Corp., 769 
F.2d at 1289 (“Penalty clauses provide an earnest of performance.”). 
 57. Cf. Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 327 
(1985). 
 58. See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Int. Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(striking down a contractual penalty in a liquidated damages provision as impermissibly punitive, 
explaining that “contract law does not allow for punitive damages unless the breach of contract is also 
a tort. . . . Parties may not . . . use . . . stipulated damages provisions as a way to secure for themselves 
greater damages in the event of a breach than contract law would normally allow.”); Kalenka v. 
Taylor, 896 P.2d 222, 229 (Alaska 1995) (holding contractual penalties violate the common law ban on 
punitive damages despite their different label); Roscoe-Gill v. Newman, 937 P.2d 673, 675 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding excessive liquidated damages are unenforceable because they are “punitive”); 
Pima Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Rampello, 812 P.2d 1115, 1117–18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding penalty 
clauses are impermissible because contract law opposes punishment for breach); Lake Ridge Acad. v. 
Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 187–88 (Ohio 1993) (holding penalty clauses are disallowed because of the 
ban on punitive damages); Wolin v. Walker, 830 P.2d 429, 433 (Wyo. 1992) (finding liquidated punitive 
damage agreements that “bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained” are 
punitive and unenforceable). 
H - Shiffrin_12 (DUKANOVIC).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:40 PM 
424                                           HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:407 
incorporated into a contract for reasons other than the motive to punish. 
For that matter, punitive damages may be sought in torts cases by 
plaintiffs not because they are interested in the punishment of the 
defendants per se but simply because they want the money. For example, 
plaintiffs might, in good faith, regard standard compensatory measures as 
inadequate given the wrong they suffered, or, in worse cases, plaintiffs 
might simply spy an opportunity for a windfall. The plaintiffs’ nonpunitive 
motives in such cases do not refute the claim that these are nonetheless 
punitive damages. In the contracts case, what seems essential about 
penalty clauses is that the specified damages are not merely nominal, that 
they exceed what, officially, is deemed to be compensatory, and perhaps, 
that they do not plausibly aim to fill a gap with respect to what are 
clearly compensatory damages—as with stipulations for attorneys’ fees. 
The authors of penalty clauses attempt to marshal the power of 
government to demand more than the damages caused by a party’s 
breach. That effort raises the question of whether the breaching party’s 
conduct merits levying extra-compensatory or punitive damages. Even if 
the reason penalties are sought does not involve a punitive motive, the 
effect of a penalty on a defendant and the potential for penalties to serve 
as levers of governmental and private oppression may suffice to raise the 
sorts of concerns that require careful, impartial deliberation and fair 
patterns of application. 
Thus, the concerns with remedial clauses seem heightened when 
penal remedies are administered, given the social significance of 
punishment. Yet, the underlying concerns seem the same, even when purely 
compensatory remedies are at issue. As a general matter, the posture of 
presumptive enforceability eviscerates the independent role of the 
judiciary in resolving public legal disputes and in identifying and imposing 
appropriate and generally applicable remedies for breaches of legal duties. 
This understanding of the purpose behind the common law rule fits 
and illuminates its main contours.59 Whenever the intention or the effect 
behind a remedial clause is punitive, it should be unenforceable—not 
primarily because punitive damages are inappropriate in contract, but 
because private determinations of remedies are inconsistent with the 
invocation and use of the public adjudication mechanism. That principle 
explains the broad rule: unless damages cannot be calculated with 
 
 59. Or rather, it fits its main contours at an abstract level. My aim is to give an argument for the 
approach and its spirit, rather than to conform to the particulars of its interpretation. So, my argument 
does not account for all of the applications of the common law rule on the ground, including less 
searching scrutiny for undercompensatory clauses than supercompensatory clauses. My argument also 
does not account for the U.S. treatment of attorneys’ fees. In the United States, successful parties are 
not—as a default—entitled to attorneys’ fees, but parties may affirmatively contract around that 
default rule and reasonable agreements are subject to enforcement. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 356(d) (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
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certainty, the judiciary should determine and impose the relevant damages. 
Where they are not calculable, private agreements may be used but they 
must themselves incorporate judicial standards of reasonability and the 
compliance with that standard will be policed. As a secondary matter, the 
ban on punitive damages in contract provides a supplementary reason 
against enforcing a punitive clause because enforcement would permit 
private parties to circumvent the ban. But, even were the ban 
reconsidered and lifted, the basic reason to refuse to enforce punitive 
clauses would persist. That is, private parties should not have substantial 
power to dictate the punishments that the public authority imposes and 
to curtail the operation of the independent judgment of an impartial 
authority about when and what punishments are appropriate.60 Thus, 
criticisms that contractual remedies are undercompensatory as a general 
matter do not, properly understood, entail the claim that remedial clauses 
should generally be enforceable.61 If contractual remedies are 
undercompensatory, as they may be, that points to a defect in the public, 
judicial treatment of contractual breach. That defect is not appropriately 
addressed through enforcing occasional bursts of private recognition, but 
rather by a revision of the public doctrine. 
C. The Proper Functions Served by Remedial Clauses 
Notice that the common law presumption against enforceability 
does not render remedial clauses a superfluity. They may still serve three 
functions. First, they may serve as informal understandings between the 
parties about how to proceed, in good faith, if the performance terms are 
not satisfied. Even if the clauses are not automatically enforceable, they 
may still serve as guidance for how the parties may voluntarily proceed 
should they encounter mutually recognized problems with performance. 
At least in those cases where these clauses are deliberately constructed 
and are not mere elements of a signed, but unread, adhesive contract, 
these terms may offer a germane blueprint for resolution at a time when 
the parties may be at odds or otherwise face difficulties in forging a fresh 
settlement agreement.62 The terms may exert moral force that may help 
 
 60. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the 
Rule of Law 33–36 (2012) (offering an analogous criticism of the ubiquitous use of adhesive fine print 
by large corporations as facilitating the private circumvention of public decisions, for instance, about 
fair use policy); Margaret Jane Radin, An Analytical Framework for Legal Evaluation of Boilerplate, 
in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 215 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) (advancing an 
analogous criticism of the use of exculpatory clauses in boilerplate to ‘delete’ rights against, for 
instance, negligence). 
 61. Contra Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 43. 
 62. I hasten to add, though, that I am not arguing that, morally, by virtue of being agreed upon, 
the designated amount perforce constitutes an adequate moral remedy. I doubt that individual moral 
agents can specify, by fiat, the moral significance of a moral breach for the same reasons that I dispute 
that individual parties can specify, by fiat, the public, legal significance of a legal breach. But, the 
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the parties avoid or resolve a dispute without resorting to judicial 
assistance.63 
Of course, the parties may seek legal recourse nonetheless, whether 
because there is a dispute over whether breach has occurred at all or 
because, faced with the actual circumstances of breach, one of the parties 
regards the prognosticated resolution as ill-fit for the occasion. Second, 
remedial clauses provide advice to the court to help craft a fair remedy, 
offering information about the perceived worth of performance as well as 
what a baseline resolution acceptable to the parties would have been 
under some circumstances of breach. If that suggested baseline seems fair 
and appropriate to the court given the anticipated circumstances of 
breach, the court may calibrate from there if the actual circumstances of 
breach differ. 
Third, as the common law explicitly allows, the clauses may 
determine the remedy where a court is disabled from ascertaining actual 
damages after breach has occurred. Where epistemic barriers prevent the 
court from directly applying its independent judgment about the 
ramifications of breach, the prior understandings of the parties may serve 
as a superior substitute to failing to offer any remedy. Although a prior 
agreement between the parties both lacks the imprimatur of an impartial 
assessment and a tailoring to the specific circumstances of the breach, it 
offers some approximation of what a fair remedy might be from the 
parties who are likely to have the best ex ante information about the 
significance and value of the prospective performances. By invalidating 
penalty clauses and by reviewing the remaining remedial clauses to 
ensure they represent fair approximations of actual damages, the 
judiciary maintains its role in calibrating remedies, even when 
information is sufficiently elusive to preclude the judiciary from playing 
its full standard role in setting remedies. 
 
agreed upon terms may serve as a reminder of what may have seemed like a fair resolution when 
heads were cooler. This may help to guide a fair assessment after breach, whether by serving as 
counterweight to any inflamed passions or by revealing the implications of prior assumptions that 
contemporary circumstances belie. Of course, as discussed in the text of this Article, ex ante 
negotiations may not be responsive to the nuances of the particular circumstances of breach and 
therefore may not be more accurate than ex post determinations. 
 63. Wilkinson-Ryan argues that when parties include remedial clauses in a contract, their 
interpretation of the obligation tends to shift. Subjectively speaking, “they transform a promise to 
perform into a promise to perform or pay.” Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage 
Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 633, 669 (2010). Thereby, breach may 
disappoint, but will not blindside, the promisee. In another Article, Wilkinson-Ryan and her colleague, 
David A. Hoffman, also suggest that hammering out remedial clauses may reduce some feelings of 
resentment and betrayal occasioned by breach because the process of formulating the clauses involves 
the parties together contemplating the possibility of breaching them. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David 
A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1001, 1038 (2010). Although both Wilkinson-
Ryan and Hoffman associate these effects with enforceable clauses, it is not clear that the mitigation of 
ill will depends on the enforceability of these clauses rather than their free, deliberate formation. 
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D. The Larger Theoretical Context 
As with almost every issue about contract doctrine, there is a danger 
in proceeding as though any particular doctrine can be adequately analyzed 
in isolation, apart from some of the larger, foundational questions about 
why we enforce contracts and the meaning of breach. In this case, the 
foregoing discussion may invite the observation that there seems to be a 
strong affinity between one’s view about breach, more generally, and 
one’s view about remedial clauses. Unsurprisingly, the defense of the 
common law view that this Article advances represents a stronger fit with 
those views of breach that regard at least some breaches as moral 
wrongs, that is, whose status as an abrogation of a legal duty is not a 
mere formality.64 The law and economics defense dovetails with more 
permissive views of breach that do not generally regard it as a moral 
wrong or as an important legal wrong.65 If breach is not an important 
legal wrong, then it may seem a little precious to put so much weight on 
the procedure by which we respond to it and fashion remedies to it.66 This 
connection between one’s theory of contractual breach and one’s theory 
of remedial clauses raises (at least) two issues, one methodological and 
one substantive. 
The methodological question is whether it is worth continued 
investigation of remedial clauses as such, or whether the issue should be 
pursued at the more foundational level of resolving whether the breach is 
a true or merely a pro forma legal wrong. Without denying these broader 
connections, there are good reasons to hone in on a corner of the doctrine, 
if only to gain a closer, vivid glimpse of the detailed implications of larger 
theoretical positions to deepen our understanding and evaluation of them. 
That closer look, of course, may gain greater focus if we also pan out on 
occasion to take in the larger theoretical context. Further, although the 
more morally permissive position about breach may fuel the more 
permissive stance on remedial clauses, the former does not entail the 
latter. One may think that breach is not an intrinsically significant moral 
 
 64. I discuss various facets of the morality of contractual breach in the following works: Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1551 (2009); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708 (2007); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Is a Contract a Promise?, in Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law 245–47 
(Andrei Marmor ed., 2012); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have 
Said?, 98 Va. L. Rev. 159, 159–76 (2012).  
 65. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439, 459 (2006); 
Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation 
Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939, 1986–2005 (2011). 
 66. Fleshing out this connection requires some maneuvering since one might think that the more 
permissive view of breach resonates with a strong resistance to penalty clauses. Of course, this does 
represent the position of a portion of the law and economics community. One might defend the more 
permissive view of breach, a strongly permissive position on enforceable remedial clauses, including 
penalty clauses, and reject judicial imposition of penalties for breach as such by stressing the ex ante 
signaling and reassurance functions of penalty clauses, or by stressing the fact of voluntary agreement. 
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episode, but once we render performance of a legal duty and we bother 
to extend judicial attention to its abrogation, even if only for 
instrumental reasons, distinct questions about the rule of law and the fair 
dispersal of remedies emerge. So, methodologically, an investigation in 
the arguments regarding the putative wrong of breach need not precede 
and does not completely determine the answers to issues about remedial 
clauses. 
A related substantive question is, if the defense of the common law 
doctrine on remedial clauses does implicitly feed off the view that breach 
is morally wrong, whether that then limits the scope of the justification 
for the common law doctrine. Even if intentional breach may represent a 
non-negligible moral or political wrong—whether in its deliberate, 
reckless, or negligent varieties—it is harder to defend any claim that 
breach itself involves wrongdoing in those cases where contract law’s 
strict liability rule operates. That is, where a party commits breach only 
inadvertently without intent or irresponsibility, no important moral or 
political wrong has occurred for which we can claim that the public, 
through the voice of the judiciary, has a stake in controlling and 
articulating the public response. So, perhaps this suggests that the 
presumption against remedial clauses should only hold where breach is 
intentional (broadly construed), but not where breach is inadvertent. 
While this position is available, it may be resisted even if one’s 
embrace of the common law presumption against remedial clauses leans 
hard on the immorality of breach. Although the case is stronger for 
exclusive judicial control over publicly imposed remedies when the 
public is expressing its assessment of a moral wrong, whenever we 
designate activity as legally actionable, we have interests in ensuring the 
fair dispersal of remedies. Where strict liability rules extend to cover a 
wide range of innocent, non-risky behavior, the risk of unjust penalty 
clauses may occupy the forefront of our attention. We have a special 
concern to ensure that the remedies for strict liability offenses do not 
exceed the compensatory; we may also be concerned to ensure that the 
policies underlying strict liability are implemented fairly uniformly. Even 
if our doctrine evolved to contemplate permitting punitive damages for 
some breaches, we might still think it important to limit the imposition of 
penalties to cases of fault, for reasons of fairness and to ensure the 
messages sent by penalties and by the strict liability rule are not 
misconstrued. 
III.  Are Remedial Decisions Special?—Settlements and Alternative 
Performance Clauses 
This argument so far depends on the idea that there is something 
special about private remedial agreements that renders them appropriately 
subject to judicial disapproval or, less strongly, to judicial scrutiny. This 
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idea is closely allied with one side of another large debate about whether 
there is a strong distinction between rights and remedies.67 Much 
skepticism about that distinction revolves around the observation that 
some agents do not respect rights and duties as such, but price them out 
according to what remedies are assigned to them. Further, the meaning 
of a remedy reduces to what anticipatory behavior it will provoke or 
deter on the part of such agents. The general rejoinder in this Article is 
that that even if the bad man or the cynical (or prudential) planner 
predictably prices or gauges the significance of a right (or a duty) in 
terms of the remedies available for enforcing it, the meaning and 
significance of the right and of the remedy may reasonably differ to third 
parties, the public, and joint ventures of good faith partners.68 The 
acknowledgement of that difference may, in turn, perpetuate the 
differential meanings, justify them, and undergird practical differences in 
treatment. 
To stay focused on contract law, this Article will not delve further 
into that large debate at the abstract level. Instead, it will address two 
immediate objections specific to remedial clauses elicited by the assertion of 
a strong distinction between rights and remedies. First, if remedial 
clauses are suspect because they purport to resolve the treatment of the 
abrogation of a legal duty through nonpublic means, then why may 
parties generally elect to settle disputes and to choose their settlement 
terms without judicial oversight or interference?69 Second, if remedial 
clauses are suspect, then why are alternative performance clauses 
enforceable, since they may yield the identical outcome as a rejected 
remedial clause?70 Do these arguments about the presumptive 
unenforceability of remedial clauses entail more radical conclusions, such 
 
 67. For one example of skepticism toward the distinction, see Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism 
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1999). 
 68. See Rebecca Stone, Legal Design for the “Good Man” (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the author) (arguing that laws may offer a variety of reasons for compliance to good, 
compliant agents who differ amongst themselves and that differ from those offered to the “bad man”). 
 69. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, consent judgments in antitrust cases are 
subject to judicial oversight and determinations that their entry serves the public interest. See 
15 U.S.C. § 16(b)–(e) (2004). To take another example, under federal law, settlements of class actions 
require judicial approval to ensure that absent class members are adequately represented. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(e). Many states’ laws also require judicial approval of class action settlements. See, e.g., Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 23(c) (“A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court.”); Pa. R. Civ. P. 1714(a) (“No class action shall be compromised, settled or discontinued 
without the approval of the court after hearing.”); Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(e) (“The court must approve any 
settlement, dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.”); see also 
Philipps Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 42 U.S. 797, 810 (1995) (implying judicial approval of settlements is 
required by due process). 
 70. See, e.g., Minnick v. Clearwire U.S. LLC, 275 P.3d 1127, 1140 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) 
(upholding a diminishing early termination fee in a cell phone contract because fulfilling the contract 
was a real alternative and hence the termination fee was an alternative performance provision, not a 
liquidated damages clause or penalty). 
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as that settlements and alternate performance clauses should attract greater 
judicial scrutiny and skepticism? If so, would that consequence serve as a 
reductio of my position? 
A. Settlements 
Let me start with the first objection and suggest three reasons courts 
might distinguish between settlements and remedial clauses, both of 
which arise from the fact that settlements are responses to purported 
claims of actual, not merely projected, breaches. First, as a general matter, 
settlement agreements involve the retraction of a complaint and the 
voluntary dismissal of a case.71 They do not require a public official to 
pass judgment on whether a legal duty has been abrogated and, if so, to 
levy an appropriate remedy in response. Nor do settlements ask a public 
official to identify an abrogation of a legal duty, but withhold their own 
judgment about what would be an appropriate remedy, while implementing 
the judgment of private, partial parties about that very matter. Because 
settlements do not implicate the judiciary’s judgment and direct the 
judiciary to levy a particular remedial assessment, they skirt some of the 
previously articulated concerns.72 
 
 71. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). 
 72. This argument requires at least three qualifications. First, some settlements involve a mutual 
agreement to circumvent the judiciary’s remedial assessment, as when settlements occur after a finding 
of liability but before the remedial order. 
  Second, although the vast majority of settlements dismiss a claim, Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to make a distinctive “offer of judgment” whose 
acceptance involves not dismissal but the registering of a judgment against the defendant without 
judicial oversight of its terms. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Even stranger, in many jurisdictions, the defendant 
may offer to accept judgment against him while nonetheless disclaiming liability. See, e.g., Chathas v. 
Local 134 IBEW, 233 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2000); Robert G. Bone, “To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 
68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1561, 1567 n.24 (2008). Perhaps this is a harmless counterpart to nolo contendere pleas in criminal law 
but it comes with a questionable sting. Should the plaintiff reject the offer but fail to win a higher 
award at trial, the plaintiff is then subject to a cost-shifting provision requiring her to pay the 
defendant’s costs incurred after the offer is rejected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). This provision seems 
insensitive to those plaintiffs who seek an official finding of liability because they seek recognition of 
the legal wrong as much, or more, than they seek damages. Likewise, the position that a plaintiff’s 
claim may be rendered moot if she rejects a settlement offer for the full amount of her claim seems 
insensitive to the plaintiff’s interest in official recognition of liability. See Weiss v. Regal Collections, 
385 F. 3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004) (“An offer of complete relief will generally moot the plaintiff’s claim, 
as at that point the plaintiff retains no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.”); Pla v. 
Renaissance Equity Holdings LLC, No. 12-CIV-5268(JMF), 2013 WL 3185560, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 
24, 2013) (finding plaintiffs’ claims moot because offer of judgment exceeded possible awardable 
damages). But see Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 950 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that “an unaccepted Rule 68 offer that would fully satisfy a plaintiff’s claim is insufficient to 
render the claim moot”); McCauley v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 402 F.3d 340, 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 
an offer of complete relief did not moot plaintiff’s claim when the offer was conditioned on 
confidentiality and judgment was not entered against defendant). 
  Third, at one point, California state courts were so eager to encourage settlements that they 
accommodated settlements contingent on vacatur of a lower court judgment by acceding to the 
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Second, many remedial clauses are rather broadly framed and are 
triggered by breach (or material breach), but are made in ignorance of 
the particular circumstances of the breach at issue. As crafted, they often 
make no attempt to calibrate the recovery to whatever specific 
circumstances of breach arise. It is true that, roughly speaking, contract 
law is indifferent to whether breach is intentional, reckless, negligent, or 
utterly inadvertent, so the breadth of remedial clauses on that score may 
be considered unremarkable. Although for the reasons stated above, it 
would be sound to maintain continued, informed oversight of that legal 
policy and its ramifications. But, remedial clauses often specify a 
particular sum of damages for breach and thereby do not take into 
account the particular, as opposed to the projected, consequential 
damages of a specific breach. By contrast, settlement agreements are 
tailored to the circumstances of the particular breach. So, we may have 
more confidence that a settlement involves a remedy crafted to reflect 
the significance of the particular legal wrong after the parties have sat 
with the wrong, rather than the application of a more general topical 
bandage to a wound that happens, in this case, to require stitches. 
Finally, even when remedial clauses are crafted in ways that reflect 
greater sensitivity to the particular circumstances of breach, such as by 
using percentages of estimated damages rather than flat fees, remedial 
clauses are nonetheless prospective agreements about a hypothetical 
breach, rather than contemporary agreements in response to an actual 
breach. Why should that matter? The traditional rule on remedial clauses 
might be thought to reflect something like the following view: when one 
party abrogates a legal duty against another, the latter should have the 
opportunity to seek public legal recognition of the fact of a legal wrong, 
an impartial reckoning of its significance in light of the circumstances, and 
an impartial determination of the remedy. One’s need for public 
 
request for vacatur, solely on the grounds that the parties both wished it and not because any new facts 
or legal considerations suggested that the lower court decision was in error or improvidently issued. 
See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992). This stance of accommodation came 
perilously close to allowing private parties to edit judicial findings, as the dissent in Neary by Justice 
Kennard and the overturned lower court decision complained. See Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1991). Reassuringly, the Supreme Court seems hostile to this 
approach within the federal system. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 
27 (2004). And, in California, the decision was sufficiently controversial to have inspired a narrowing 
statute. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 128(a)(8) (West 2000) (permitting vacatur to facilitate a private 
agreement only when there is no reasonable possibility of an adverse effect on nonparties and the 
public, and only when the parties’ interests are sufficiently weighty to overwhelm the erosion in the 
public trust occasioned by such vacaturs); see also Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating 
Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1471, 1472–73, 1485 (1994) (discussing the tension between litigant 
autonomy, illustrated by the vacatur in Neary, and judicial control of litigation); Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Good Judging and Good Judgment, 35 Ct. Rev. 8 (1998) (discussing the fervency of lower court 
judge’s opposition to the Neary rule and the resultant controversy). 
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recognition and an impartial resolution may reasonably depend upon the 
particular circumstances of the abrogation of the legal duty. Some 
abrogations might be predictable and not morally charged, especially 
where a strict liability rule concerning performance does the work, but 
other abrogations might involve mistreatment—for example, where 
fraud, duress, or other forms of intentional breach are involved. 
Enforceable remedial clauses, when they are satisfied by the 
breaching party, deprive promisees of the opportunity to seek such 
recognition and reckoning. They require promisees to absorb the 
significance of an abrogation of duty before it has happened, before the 
specific circumstances and motivations of the breach are known, and 
during the period in which the parties are correctly more focused on 
arranging mutually satisfactory circumstances for performance. Having 
to absorb the significance of breach, as a general, hypothetical matter73 
seems potentially insensitive to the reasonable promisee’s reaction to the 
actual occasion of breach.74 It also seems in tension with a reasonable 
legal resistance to blanket pre-authorizations for breaches of legal duties. 
Whereas, accepting or pursuing a settlement offer after breach involves 
having consciously waived one’s opportunity after the particular facts and 
circumstances of the breach are known to the promisee. Because those 
who settle had an opportunity to pursue public recognition of the wrong, 
the settlement process shows greater sensitivity to this interest than the 
pre-ordaining involved in enforceable remedial clauses.75 
 
 73. See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1780–89; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition 
and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 227 (1995) (stressing the difficulty of accurately 
imagining all the possible circumstances of breach). 
 74. There is some evidence that people disvalue breach less strongly ex ante than ex post. See 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 
6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 405, 415–17 (2009) (finding, in web-based polls about hypothetical 
scenarios, that people set lower damages ex ante than ex post). 
 75. Does this position suggest hostility to the enforcement of prenuptial clauses as examples of 
blanket remedial clauses? Not necessarily. For one thing, many marriages end without any allegation 
of breach or some failure to perform a duty within the marital relationship. Many prenuptial clauses 
do not represent themselves as responses to breach by one party rather than another but as guidelines 
in the event of dissolution. Moreover, prenuptial clauses may, in part, attempt to specify what 
previously acquired assets constitute individual property and therefore not subject to future 
application of community property rules or other background rules of marital property. Such 
specification would be relevant to later remedial action but, however framed, that content in itself is 
not a contractual remedial provision. Finally, a posture of enforcement of many prenuptial clauses 
may also represent a political position that, at least as a default, the community should take the 
position that the parties share responsibility for the dissolution of a marriage and many of its 
particularities are private and epistemically impenetrable; so, a judicial investigation into the particular 
circumstances of the dissolution would be in tension with respecting the privacy of the parties and the 
intricacy of the marital relationship. This comports with some of the cases refusing to enforce, where 
the clause would involve finding one party at fault, an activity in tension with no-fault divorce policies. 
See Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 2002). Conversely, a posture of skepticism 
toward prenuptial clauses may reflect less of a resistance to remedial clauses than a general skepticism 
about stretching the analogy between marriage and other contracting relations too far. Like other 
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But, one might object, why shouldn’t the preservation of this 
interest be up to the parties? If it matters to them, they may refuse to 
sign remedial clauses and, if it does not, they should be allowed to take 
advantage of the benefits that remedial clauses afford. The potential for 
later regret or one’s failure to anticipate the nuanced feel of conditions of 
future performance does not count, generally, as a reason to refuse to 
enforce performance clauses in executory contracts. Why should they 
constitute reasons to be shy in enforcing remedial clauses? 
The best answer to this objection appeals to the underlying fact that 
all private law has public law dimensions. Once we create legal duties, as 
a general matter, the public has an interest in their fulfillment and their 
vindication. As a predominantly “private” form of law, much of the 
contract law’s attention is directed by decisions made by private parties, 
including the determination of the content of those primary legal duties. 
Moreover, with the duties of “private” law, because private parties bear 
the brunt of their burdens as well as the effects of their violation, we 
generally assign private parties the power to pursue their vindication, 
despite the underlying, concomitant public interest.76 When the parties 
decide to settle, in addition to representing themselves, they are, morally 
speaking, partly representing the public’s dual interests in the vindication 
of these rights and duties as well as in the resolution of conflicts amicably 
and with sensitivity to the particularities of the conflict. The public may 
reasonably decide both that: (1) given the strong stake held by the 
private parties involved, they may be safely empowered exclusively to act 
on the public’s behalf to vindicate legal rights and duties when those 
parties come to an agreement in the aftermath of a dispute but (2) that 
the public’s interests would not be satisfied if that delegation of authority 
stretched so far as to include a permissive doctrine toward ex ante 
resolutions, in essence, enforceable remedial clauses. The public might 
adopt this latter stance on the ground that those clauses reinforce the 
incorrect impression that breach is permissible so long as a price is paid 
(or that rights and remedies are in fact interchangeable). It might also 
take this stance for the milder reason that such agreements are less likely 
to represent a nuanced reaction to the particularities of breach, a 
reaction that the public has its own interests in facilitating. For these 
reasons, it seems that some principled distinctions may be made between 
the permission to parties to fashion their own enforceable settlements 
 
contracts, the agreement to marry or to cohabitate may alter one’s legal duties, but, usually, there are 
no specific performance obligations and it seems strained to think of the dissolution of the relationship 
as a form or product of breach. If so, then prenuptial clauses might be resisted, not for the reasons 
stated here, but because they presuppose a neat framework that these relationships do not fit. 
 76. In class actions, because the interests of the particular plaintiffs may not represent the entire 
class, that assumption might not hold and our rules about settlements correspondingly differ. See supra 
note 69 and accompanying text. 
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after breach and the resistance to permitting them to fashion enforceable 
remedial clauses prior to breach.77 
B. Alternative Performance Clauses 
Let me now turn to the challenge posed by alternative performance 
clauses. Under traditional common law, parties may specify alternative 
performance terms that, for example, specify different prices depending 
on when performance occurs such as, offering a bonus for performance 
by a deadline or a discount for late performance. Although courts will 
police such terms to ensure they are not unconscionable and they do not 
represent a circumvention of the rule against penalties, the greater 
deference afforded to such terms seems in tension with the supposed 
barrier against enforcing remedial clauses unless proof of loss is difficult. 
If alternative performance clauses are enforceable, subject to the 
unconscionability constraint, and if they may produce the same outcome 
in response to the same activities as a remedial clause, then how could it 
make sense to subject remedial clauses to different standards of 
enforcement?78 
A deeper theoretical point lurks: one might be tempted to say that 
the enforcement of remedial clauses both demands that the judiciary put 
its imprimatur on the clause and implicates the judiciary in its content 
because the judiciary lends its approval and the resources of enforcement 
measures behind the clause. Given the judiciary’s involvement, it may 
reasonably set terms for its approval and the use of its powers. But, this 
line of argument will not explain why the doctrine of remedial clauses 
differs so mightily from the doctrine regulating performance terms. 
When a judge interprets a performance term or deems it enforceable, the 
court will then lend its approval and its resources of enforcement behind 
that term. So, if judicial involvement is a rationale for searching judicial 
scrutiny of the content of remedial clauses or for the presumption against 
enforceability, then that argument should rear back and impugn the 
presumption for enforceability of performance terms. 
Of course, the divergence between the scrutiny of performance 
terms and remedial terms can be overstated. Not any old agreement 
between parties is enforceable. The doctrines of consideration, public 
 
 77. Even so, drawing this distinction is compatible with the critique that we may have become 
overly complacent about settlements, whether on the grounds that settlements preclude a public 
reckoning of an important wrong or, as some believe, that settlements favor particular parties to the 
disadvantage of others who would be more fairly treated by litigation and by the judiciary. See Fiss, 
supra note 52, at 1076–77 (arguing that poorer parties may be disadvantaged in terms of time and 
access to information in ways that affect their bargaining position in settlements but that might be 
partly mitigated in litigation because, for example, the judiciary can ask questions, call its own 
witnesses, and invite amici participation). 
 78. See sources cited supra note 17. 
H - Shiffrin_12 (DUKANOVIC).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:40 PM 
February 2016]           REMEDIAL CLAUSES 435 
policy, and unconscionability already represent constraints on parties’ 
ability to determine for themselves the content of enforceable terms and 
the fact of judicial implication may help to explain why.79 Still, even if the 
degree of difference is not as dramatic as that between acid and base, 
parties enjoy greater degrees of freedom in dictating enforceable 
performance terms. The judicial implication argument cannot alone 
explain that difference. 
So, why are remedial clauses special? Should parties enjoy greater 
autonomy in setting enforceable performance terms than they do in 
formulating remedial clauses? The answer, I suspect, has its source in an 
account of the purpose of contracting and contract law. Setting 
performance terms allows parties to exercise their autonomy by 
curtailing their freedom in one domain in order to engage in cooperative 
activities with another, to enter into and shape relationships with one 
another, and thereby to expand their opportunities and agency through 
another’s permission. Judicial oversight of formation terms and of their 
interpretation serves both the function of celebrating cooperative 
activity, by rendering it a public subject matter to which we are willing to 
lend our community resources, and to ensure that alterations in a party’s 
portfolio of freedom and commitment stay within the range of 
normatively available transformations; that is, that no party makes a 
commitment to engage in activity not freely available to her or to 
demand from another something she was not free to give or did not in 
fact give. Judicial interference with parties’ performance terms, then, 
may correctly be thought to involve a lighter touch because the judicial 
role here is to protect and facilitate parties’ autonomy, to ensure their 
agreement does not overstep the parties’ legitimate domains of authority, 
and to protect any third-party rights at stake. 
Whereas, when remedial clauses are at issue, the judiciary’s role 
goes beyond that of protecting and facilitating autonomous agreements. 
If a remedial clause is at issue, then we have an abrogation of a legal 
duty, which implicates the rule of law, independent of the underlying 
purposes of the contract law. The parties’ own autonomy interests and 
the purpose of contract suggest a reason why they enjoy substantial 
power in reconfiguring their individual portfolios of rights and 
responsibilities,80 but it does not suggest a reason to think that 
determining the public response to an abrogation of a legal duty also falls 
under their private control. Where duties that assume a public status are 
 
 79. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and 
Accommodation, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205 (2000) (arguing that the rationale for unconscionability 
might be the court’s self-regarding concern not to facilitate or be complicit in exploitation). 
 80. Thus, it is compatible, with the argument offered here, which pertains to remedial clauses 
within a legally enforceable contract, to respect clauses disclaiming that the agreement reflects the 
intention to be legally bound as per Restatement § 21. 
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unsatisfied, we might have public reasons to ensure that our response 
remains measured, sensitive to intention and culpability, sensitive to 
consequences and the particularities of the situation, and sensitive to the 
treatment of like cases. We might also have public reasons to ensure that 
our response takes into account how and to what end our collective 
resources will be deployed. 
These points are not belied by the possibility that permissible 
performance terms and unenforceable remedial clauses might point 
toward the same material outcomes. Two related differences in formal 
posture matter here. First, when the parties devise alternative performance 
terms, they represent the options as genuine options, election of either of 
which would satisfy the parties and achieve the purpose of the 
interaction and the object of exchange. That is, the alternatives are not 
weighted by priority with one the fallback or second option relative to 
the other. One might, in fact, be the better option for one or both parties 
but, as represented, the promisor is free to choose between them.81 The 
election to perform one or the other, coupled with performance, amounts 
to adequate performance under the contract. 
By contrast, a remedial clause attaches to an activity that amounts 
to a breacha failure to perform a legal duty. Its use suggests a ranking 
by the parties of one activity (performance) over another (breach) and 
the form conveys that the ranking is not merely of preference but of 
kind. That is, nonperformance is not a matter of discretionary election by 
the promisor but consists of a unilateral abrogation of a duty. One path 
to the material outcome officially amounts to performance under the 
contract and the other path represents a failure under the contract, 
unilaterally imposed by the promisor, and not what the parties represented 
to themselves as one of the sought-for methods of conducting their 
contractual relationship. Were the parties to think otherwise and the 
promisee truly regarded payment in lieu of performance of the primary 
term as perfectly acceptable, the parties could convey this through an 
explicit alternative performance clause. 
Second, even if some parties in fact are indifferent to whether a 
remedial clause is invoked or not, the form of the remedial clause 
represents a defective performance of a legal relationship, a breakdown 
in the relationship, and an abrogation of a legal duty. This status 
activates the special concern of the judiciary to remedy such tears in the 
fabric of legal compliance and resolve the conflicts arising from them. 
 
 81. Compare generally Minnick v. Clearwire U.S. LLC, 275 P.3d 1127, 1127 (Wash. 2012) (en 
banc) (analyzing an early termination fee as an alternative performance clause on this ground) with In 
re Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726, 752–53 (Ct. App. 2011) (using the same 
analysis but finding an early termination fee in a cellphone contract was not an alternative 
performance clause but a penalty clause because the “alternatives” would not be reasonable choices 
for the promisor and because the promisee invoked the clause as liquidated damages). 
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These formal distinctions mark important differences for the 
relations between the parties, and may also carry legal consequences. As 
Allen Farnsworth observes, with alternate performance clauses, the 
promisee cannot seek specific performance for the failure to perform one 
of the specific alternates (even when one alternate is the primary duty 
and the alternative is to pay).82 This marks an instance of the more 
general point that where the clause is remedial and the promisor has 
breached, promisees may also seek equitable relief in addition to the 
relief in the remedial clause in those jurisdictions that do not regard 
remedial clauses as exclusive avenues of relief.83 
Indeed, given the different meanings embedded in these structures, 
coupled with the possibility of similar material outcomes, one might 
argue the availability of alternative performance terms buttresses, rather 
than undermines, the argument for the common law stance. Parties who 
are truly indifferent to performance at Time 1 for one price or 
performance at Time 2 for a different price may signal that through clear 
language in the body of the contract by specifying genuinely alternative 
performances. The general posture against enforceable remedial clauses 
cannot, then, be criticized for precluding that relationship between 
parties. The conjunction of these doctrines enables parties who wish to 
make performance at Time 1 uniquely salient and to make the 
agreement for that performance the locus of the legal duty. Still, using a 
remedial clause, they may specify a proposed remedy to communicate 
other information to their contractual partner and to the judiciary about 
a preferred course of action at Time 2, in case damages are difficult to 
prove for the disfavored case of nonperformance at Time 1. The 
preservation of the traditional common law rule offers parties more 
concrete forms by which to communicate with each other and to form 
substantively different sorts of relationships, whereas, its elimination 
would constrain these differentiated opportunities. 
Thus, it is ironic that law and economics scholars and others who 
champion freedom of contract criticize the traditional common law on 
the grounds that the obstacles it poses to remedial clauses may be 
circumvented by resort to alternative performance clauses. Instead, the 
ability to achieve the same material outcome through another means 
should be regarded as an argument for the common law approach 
because the possibility of circumventing the rule renders it immune to 
the criticism that it frustrates the will of freely consenting parties. To the 
contrary, the conjunction of the restriction on remedial clauses and the 
mechanism of alternative performance clauses offers parties an 
 
 82. See Farnsworth, supra note 13, § 12.18, at 848. 
 83. See, e.g., Pinnacle Healthcare, LLC v. Sheets, 17 N.E.3d 947, 953–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 
(holding that the presence of a liquidated damages clause did not preclude injunctive relief stemming 
from a noncompete clause). 
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additional option they lack in a system that is more permissive toward 
enforcing remedial clauses. A doctrine presuming against enforceability 
allows parties to communicate information to each other and prospective 
adjudicators about remedies that might be appropriate, while conveying 
that they are not indifferent between performance of the primary duty 
and provision of the remedy but categorically favor the former. Because 
the traditional common law rule supplies a mechanism for parties to 
convey a distinct message to each other and third parties about their 
relationship while also permitting them to achieve, through other means, 
the same material outcome that enforceable remedial clauses would 
permit, the traditional common law rule should be celebrated as promoting 
freedom of contract, rather than disparaged. 
C. Which Is Which? 
Understanding the distinction this way offers some resources toward 
answering the question how remedial clauses are to be identified as 
against alternative performance clauses. Remedial clauses, of course, 
may appear late in the contract, and may refer to breach as such, but, 
importantly, they will not explicitly represent the remedial activity as a 
disjunctive option to be elected at the discretion of the promisor. 
Despite this structural difference, not all clauses will wear their 
structures on their sleeves. In such cases, determining whether one is 
handling a remedial clause that is appropriately treated by the traditional 
rule might be challenging. Courts could engage in interpretative analysis 
to unearth the submerged structure of the relationship in order both to 
honor the intentions of the parties and to protect the social values so far 
surveyed. But, even a functional analysis may prove challenging. 
To take one example, waivers of consequential damages pose a hard 
case. In large part, these are explicitly and specifically allowed by the 
UCC, although their enforceability is rebuttably presumed invalid for 
injury caused by consumer goods and further limited both by the 
unconscionability rule and by the requirement that the UCC’s general 
remedial provisions will apply where “circumstances cause an exclusive 
or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose.”84 Whether this 
permissive stance is justified (or, how often respect for these clauses 
would fail the essential purpose of a remedy) raises some hard issues, the 
resolution of which depends in some measure on the resolution of some 
issues concerning strict liability in contract. 
On the one hand, such waivers seem like a variety of remedial 
clause because they dictate that the promisor will not be liable for certain 
sorts of damages occasioned by breach, and so they seem to fall squarely 
in the category of a remedial clause. General waivers of consequential 
 
 84. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2002). 
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damages replace the law’s assessment of the significance of breach, which 
makes the breaching party responsible for the foreseeable consequences 
of breach, with a private parties’ assessment of a more limited 
appropriate remedy. At this level of generality, they seem to be defective 
for the same reasons as other remedial clauses. 
On the other hand, unlike many remedial clauses, a waiver of 
consequential damages isolates a discrete form of damages. It does not 
represent itself as offering a comprehensive remedy for breach (nor does 
it attempt to value those consequential damages). Hence, its enforcement 
would not entirely displace the judiciary’s role in assessing the significance 
of breach as more comprehensive remedial clauses do. 
Moreover, imagining other specific cases, consequential damage 
waivers could be reasonably viewed as performance terms. Specifically, 
these waivers seem a plausible mechanism for specifying the extent of 
one’s exposure in the specific case where breach is faultless. That is, they 
might be viewed as liability specifications rather than remedial 
specifications.85 As I argue elsewhere,86 liability for faultless breach is a 
reasonable, implicit default term that accompanies the promise to 
perform; it is an assumed responsibility, rather than a remedy for the 
breach of the promise to perform. Although a valuable moral mechanism 
encouraging relations of trust is embedded in the strict liability default, 
as a theoretical matter, promisors might reasonably negotiate around this 
default term, consistent with their primary promise to perform. That is, 
they might promise to do all they can to perform, without fault, but 
decline to assume responsibility (and therefore, liability) for obstacles to 
success that are not reasonably attributable to them. In this light, one 
might view some narrowly tailored consequential damage waivers as 
performance terms that partly disclaim the default implicit term that 
assigns promisors the additional responsibility of liability for faultless 
failure.87 
Although such waivers, if specifically tailored and transparently 
worded, are consistent with the resistance to enforceable remedial clauses 
advanced here, this is not the form consequential damages waivers 
typically take. Standard consequential damage waivers make no 
distinction between faulty and faultless breach and so would, insofar as 
they are enforceable, wrongfully substitute private remedial judgments 
for public remedial judgments. 
 
 85. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies (4th ed. 2010) (distinguishing liability 
limitations from remedy limitations). 
 86. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Seybert Lecture at University of Pennsylvania: Extending 
Responsibility Beyond Fault (Oct. 21, 2014). 
 87. Could this argument be extended to other remedial clauses, if they were limited to faultless 
breach? In theory, yes, but consequential damages waivers and “best efforts” performance clauses are 
the most salient mechanisms to limit liability and exposure for faultless breach. 
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Given some of the difficulties of interpreting the implicit structure 
of clauses of this kind and of disentangling reasonable performance term 
elements from elements that represent remedial overreaching, courts 
could sharpen that boundary by imposing default interpretation rules 
that force greater transparency from the parties. For example, they may 
presume that, unless the disjunctive form is explicitly used, the clause is a 
largely advisory, often unenforceable, remedial clause. Similarly, courts 
may presume that unless consequential damage waivers distinguish 
between faultless and faulty breach, they represent advisory remedial 
clauses.88 
Conclusion 
The trend toward relaxing the bar against remedial clauses and the 
arguments I have been rehearsing against such clauses may be viewed as 
a sliver of the larger general trend toward and resistance to privatization 
of the law, whether through private policing,89 private prisons,90 or 
contracting out government work to private companies.91 Indeed, in the 
contracts domain, similar arguments may be made, for instance, against 
the expansion of the use and enforcement of arbitration clauses. 
Independent of legitimate charges about the unfair conditions of their 
imposition and industry capture,92 the enforcement of mandatory arbitration 
clauses, critics claim, usurps a traditional judicial function and deprives 
victims of access to crucial mechanisms of justice.93 Arbitration clauses 
 
 88. Of course, other default rules could be adopted. Courts could assume that unless clearly 
labeled as a remedial clause that addresses breach as such, the clause is an enforceable alternative 
performance clause or, to take the other example, a performance term limiting consequential damages 
(insofar as such limitations are not unconscionable and do not frustrate the underlying purpose of a 
remedial regime). Diffidently, I would suggest against such default rules in favor of approaches that 
protect the unwary from non-salient performance terms, but a developed argument for one 
interpretative approach rather than another seems a task for another paper. 
 89. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165 (1999). 
 90. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in Government by 
Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy 128 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); 
Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 Duke L.J. 437, 439–548 (2005). 
 91. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1285 (2003); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367 (2003); Jon 
D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 717 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, 
Privatization’s Progeny, 101 Geo. L.J. 1023 (2013). See generally Government by Contract: 
Outsourcing and American Democracy (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (raising 
concerns regarding the widespread shift of federal and state government work to private 
organizations). 
 92. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1151, 1174–75 (2009) 
(discussing charges of arbitrator bias “in favor of the repeat-player corporation . . . .”); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 876, 895 (2008) (documenting 
“corporations’ selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against each other . . . .”). 
 93. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J. 2804 (2015); David Schwartz, Enforcing 
H - Shiffrin_12 (DUKANOVIC).DOCX (Do Not Delete) 2/9/2016 1:40 PM 
February 2016]           REMEDIAL CLAUSES 441 
direct the substitution of a private adjudicator for a public official and 
may use procedures and evidentiary rules that do not satisfy the demands 
of due process. Arbitration decisions often go unpublished, do not enter 
any public record that could be the basis of accountability and public 
evaluation, and often do not establish precedents.94 Further, the recent 
trend to use arbitration clauses to preclude class-wide adjudication (and 
arbitration) threatens, in practice, to render a variety of legal wrongs 
beyond redress.95 I agree with that critique and subscribe to the more 
general anxiety about the privatization of legal functions. 
The commonalities are strong but, nonetheless, remedial clauses 
present some distinctive theoretical issues in addition to those posed by 
arbitration clauses. Although arbitrators lack the status and full panoply 
of responsibilities of judges, in theory, arbitrators nevertheless attempt to 
act in their stead and to assess and express a public, impartial reaction to 
legal wrongs after their occurrence (rather than before in a mode that 
might be (mis)construed as price-setting).96 That is, roughly speaking, 
arbitrators may follow different procedural rules, but in the theories that 
justify the use of arbitrators, the presupposition is that arbitrators are 
neutral third parties. Often, they aim to interpret and implement the 
substantive law, including the law of remedies, and to follow judicial 
precedents.97 All of these aspirations may be outrageously belied by the 
 
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled 
Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33 (1997); David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set It Free: How 
“Mandatory” Undermines “Arbitration,” 8 Nev. L.J. 400 (2007); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247 (2009); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631 (2005); Myriam Gilles, The End of Doctrine: Private 
Arbitration, Public Law and the Anti-Lawsuit Movement (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Faculty 
Research Paper No. 436, 2014). 
 94. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 52, at 114. Some arbitrators do use prior 
arbitration decisions and awards as rough precedent, more so in labor arbitrations than other kinds of 
arbitrations. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 
90 N.C. L. Rev. 1091 (2012). 
 95. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (holding that 
the Federal Arbitration Act does not permit invalidation of a class-arbitration waiver just because the 
cost of individual arbitration would be prohibitive and exceed the potential recovery); AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted 
finding class-arbitration waivers unconscionable under California state law); see also Gilles, supra note 
93; Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 52. 
 96. But see Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of 
Adjudication and Contract, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 431, 473–88 (2010) (arguing that arbitration sometimes 
should be understood on this arbitration-as-judging model but sometimes should be conceived 
differently, on an arbitration-as-gap-filling model). 
 97. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see also Weidemaier, supra note 94. Nonetheless, the 
view that arbitrators are to interpret and implement the law is not comprehensively followed or agreed 
to by arbitrators; arbitrators sometimes favor the content of the agreement over the law. See Thomas 
E. Carbonneau, The Law and Practice of Arbitration 59 (5th ed. 2014); Frank Elkouri & Edna 
Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, at 10-110-80 (Kenneth May et al. eds., 7th ed. 2012). Parties who 
wish to ensure arbitrators follow the law might encounter obstacles under federal law. See, e.g., Hall 
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practice,98 but without resisting those empirical facts, there is a 
theoretical point to make here as well. 
What seems distinctive (and distinctively troubling) about remedial 
clauses is that they aim to substitute a private, particularist judgment for 
what, traditionally and for good reason, has been a public, general, 
impartial judgment about the significance of a legal wrong. For this 
reason, a regime of presumptively enforceable remedial clauses 
represents a further, distinct inroad against public values and the rule of 
law. Hence, the combination of enforceable mandatory arbitration 
clauses and enforceable remedial clauses seems doubly problematic 
because even when one party seeks redress for a legal wrong, that wrong 
will not only be privately adjudicated and the disposition shielded from 
public view, but the disposition will turn on a privately fashioned, partial 
remedial rule. 
Where challenging epistemic circumstances preclude the operation 
of the judiciary’s independent judgment, enforceable remedial clauses 
might serve a helpful function. But, a broader reliance on them further 
eviscerates the important role of the judiciary in vindicating the public 
interest in addressing legal wrongs fairly, impartially, and independently. 
In this case, the traditional rule got it right. The judiciary’s special role in 
crafting and meting out remedies should not be outsourced. 
 
 
St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 58486 (2008) (holding that parties may not expand 
expedited judicial review under the Federal Arbitration Act to include review for mistakes of law). 
Some states, however, permit review of arbitration awards for mistakes of law. See, e.g., Sands v. 
Menard, Inc., 767 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“We are satisfied that manifest disregard of 
the law remains a basis for vacating arbitration awards in Wisconsin.”), rev’d on other grounds, 787 
N.W.2d 384 (Wis. 2010). Other states allow parties to limit arbitrators’ authority to issue decisions 
containing legal errors. See, e.g., Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1170 (Ala. 
2010) (holding that expanded judicial review of arbitration awards are enforceable under Alabama law 
and stating that “the holding of Hall Street is applicable only in a federal court”); Cable Connection, 
Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008) (“We conclude that the Hall Street holding is 
restricted to proceedings to review arbitration awards under the [Federal Arbitration Act], and does 
not require state law to conform with its limitations.”); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 
100 (Tex. 2011) (holding that parties may expand judicial review of an arbitration award under the 
Texas Arbitration Act to include review for mistakes of law). 
 98. See, e.g., Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 52, at 109, 114 (documenting major 
arbitrator’s track record of favoring corporate clients over consumers and discussing failure to publish 
opinions with lack of accountability over time); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, 
Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Meditation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management 
in Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 53 (2014) (finding that when Fortune 1000 
companies have not used arbitration in disputes, leading concerns included: arbitrators may not follow 
the law and lack of confidence in neutrals); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World 
of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 395, 416–27 (2010) (describing possible issues of bias in 
mandatory arbitration of consumer, employment, and securities disputes). 
